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Article 3

Post-Lecture Discussion
SPEAKER:
MODERATOR:
SPEECH:

ROGER FISHER
BARBARA J. FICK
"COPING WITH CONFLICT:
WHAT KIND OF THEORY MIGHT HELP?"

DATE:

FEBRUARY 21, 1992

Professor Fick: [Professor, Notre Dame Law School.]
Any questions for Professor Fisher?
Participant:At some point the substantive dimension becomes important. We can all feel good three months from now about a
congressional, business, or multi-national agreement on the ozone.
But we'll feel better about ,it if, in fact, we take action to close it.
So at what point does the issue of substantive expertise, that is,
that some solutions are better than others, because of certain
scientific findings, play into this process?
Professor Fisher: It's a process question. That is, when and how do
you have experts on tap and not on top? How do you bring them
in? How do you have them work?
I would frequently use the single negotiating textbook process.
If I'm going around with a draft, and I say that I'm not offering
this, I'm not proposing it yet, but tell me what's wrong with this. I
want experts to tell me what's wrong; I want experts to tell me
the risks, clarify the choices. It's likely to enter an interim agreement if they do 'more research, whether it's breast implants or the
ozone layer. Do something and then we'll do work on further
data. We want to be able to deal with the on-going uncertainties,
decisions under risk. That's bringing them in. That's designing a
process for experts. That's not just asking the experts to produce
their judgment that [an action is, for example,] sixty percent
dangerous. What danger? What choice? Let's get some action
paper that somebody can order, sign,, vote, do something that
takes account of that risk.
So I find that as a mediator, I use a one-text procedure.
There's a danger if I come and I say, I've got a proposal-this is
the way Secretary Haig did it. He said, "I have a draft; Is this good
enough?" And the implicit question is: Or would you rather have
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something better? There's only one answer to that question: I'd
rather have something better. If you keep coming up with a draft,
you've got to keep saying: Is this good enough? Or: Would you
rather have something better? There is only one answer to that
question. So you have to have a way of saying: I'm thinking of
making a proposal. What's wrong with this draft? What interest of
yours does it not take adequately into account, recognizing the
interests of others? That's the Camp David process. You go round
and round, twenty-three drafts; no one made a proposal. When it
went through the process, [Menachim] Begin, [former prime
minister of Israel,] said, "I'll accept Clause IV." They said, 'We're
not offering Clause IV; we're still drafting." Just like an architect
who has a plan, you can't say I accept the front hall, while the
whole thing is being worked on. So round and round and round.
Finally, on Sunday morning, it's all been printed; it's final; it's the
proposal. Yes or no? And then the choice is not would I rather
have something better. The choice is whether I would rather have
this or disagreement, disaster, nightmare, whatever it might be.
And it's in this process that I would bring the substantive experts
in.
Participant:How do you convince people that process is important,
particularly in the academic setting?
Professor Fisher: It's doing it. The best way to do that -is to not even
argue that process is important. Simply have the process very
clearly in your mind. For example, let's say you're working out the
Peace Studies curriculum, course offerings, and credit arrangements for next year. You go around saying, "I've got a rough
draft. Before our committee makes a suggestion, I'd like your
input. I'd like your input on that." Go around with half a dozen
drafts. "No commitment yet. I don't want you committing to no or
yes. I just want the best advice I can." When they discover that
you have next year's thing all worked out happily, they may notice
that process is important. But operate on the assumption that
you're right and discuss the next question.
I used to debate people. I'd say, you know, I'm thinking of
training diplomats jointly, from different countries at the same
time. They would say that it would never work. The Russians, you
can't trust them; the Germans this, the Frenchmen that. Finally, I
said, hell with that. I'm doing a seminar in Salzburg this summer.
I've got a lot of diplomats coming together. What should I teach
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them? They all said, well, you'll want to teach them about this and
teach them about that. They all accept the premise and go on to
the next discussion.
In discussing with the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, I
said, "If we ran a joint seminar, how would you pick the diplomats
from other countries, and what would the content be, and would
you be worried about classified information?" He said, "No, classified information would be no problem. We'll take one each from
the other countries .

. . ."

And I said, "For five years now we've

been doing joint training at the. Diplomatic Academy in Bonn for
the Federal Republic of Germany in which typically twenty German diplomats and twenty diplomats from other countries: Greek,
Spanish, Russian, American, one from each. And every negotiation
is an international negotiation, every simulation, every day of the
five-day workshop. And it takes about two to three days before
some German ambassador says, 'Oh, you're not the enemy; you
and I are fellow professionals. We've got to come up with something that you can sell your government and I can sell mine. In
fact, we are co-mediators between our two governments, aren't we?
Our job is to craft something we each can sell our two governments. Oh, that's what negotiators are. Of course our governments
disagree; that's why they need professionals like us.'"
So I would never argue process. I never try to get people to
accept the process. I never get people convinced that process is
important, I just do it. I just run the process.
At one time Ijack] Matlock, [former U.S. Ambassador to
Moscow,] when he was working at the White House, and Soviet
Ambassador [Anatoly] Dobrynin was leaving, there was a misunderstanding. I had lunch with Jack Matlock, and I had dinner with
Oleg Sokolov of the Soviet Embassy. They were out of phase with
one another. Each one was waiting for the other one to make a
response. I didn't say pr6cess was important. I invited them to dinner. I invited the two of them to come to dinner. They came to
dinner. Why not? It was a small dinner. And they talked from
seven o'clock till midnight. And about three months later, I called
up the White House and I said, "Would you ask Ambassador
Matlock if he wants to come to a dinner like the kind we had in
May?". And the next day, I got a funny phone call from his secretary. She said, "Mr.Fisher, Ambassador Matlock came to me this
morning and asked me to call you about a dinner invitation you
left here yesterday. And I have nothing on my calendar. And I
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asked him what night it was to be, and he said to tell Professor
Fisher, any night." They both came together like that.
But I don't say that the process is important. Don't argue the
process; just use the process.
ProfessorAttanasio: (John Attanasio, Director of the Hesburgh International Institute for Peace Studies and Professor, Notre Dame
Law School.]
What are your reflections on venue? How do you see the
current Arab-Israeli negotiations, where venue has been a very hot

issue? What are the advantages of different venues? What about
that process question?
Professor Fisher: In general, I think venue is not important except

for security, physical facilities, logistical problems, and travel. Can
they come? Are they safe? Are they away from the telephone in a
place where people feel comfortable?
I think in the current talks that venue is being used to divert
attention away from the main topics. In the current talks, I think
both sides are playing to public opinion. Neither the Israelis nor
the Palestinians, or anybody else in the Middle East, is producing
the kind of agreement that you can expect them to accept. That
is, the Israelis have never, since 1945, produced an official proposal-for good reason-a substantive proposal map of Israel. Because
there are those that want a big Israel, those that want a democratic Israel, and those that want an overwhelmingly Jewish Israel.
Well, if Israel is big and democratic, it's no longer overwhelmingly
Jewish. If it's big and Jewish, it's not democratic. If it's Jewish and
democratic, it's not very big. And anyone who puts a proposal on
the table will lose the constituency immediately in Israel, only to
be greeted by the Palestinian response: "If that's your opening
proposal, let's negotiate." And they will be out of office. The same
is comparably true on the Palestinian side. The partition plan had
to be drafted by others.
U.N. Resolution 242 had to be drafted by others. Camp David
had to be drafted by others. There is no chance that the parties
at these talks will draft an agreement that they can sign. They
can't do it politically. They can't do it.
Further, I think the Palestinians should be working on their
alternative agreement. My surmise is that [Yitzhak] Shamir, [former prime minister of Israel,] doesn't want an agreement. He
wants to placate American public opinion long enough to keep
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changing the facts and just preclude an agreement from coming
around. He'd rather have an adversary and keep the territories
and go on than have a peace agreement. That's my perception. If
that's true, the Palestinians had better prepare a draft of what
they're going to do, or have somebody prepare it. My current
suggestion would be the French or the Egyptians or somebody
should come into the Security Council and say, "Here's a long
resolution. We propose that you admit Palestine as a separate
member to the U.N., provided it accepts the following forty-two
conditions: open, unarmed,- unlimited verification, no troops, no
military force, no tanks, that Israeli inspectors can seize suspected
contraband, litigate later, whatever it is." Meet the Palestinian
interest-a homeland, a flag, and a place they belong-and the
Israeli interest of security. And say that unless the Israelis come up
with something better, I urge you to admit Palestine as a separate
member of the U.N. That's their best alternative in negotiations.
But somebody else has to do it. They can't draft that.
I think venue is grossly exaggerated.
Participant:One of the things that's in the deep background of
many conflicts that require negotiation is a perception that you
must negotiate from strength. How do you deal with this? The
people don't want to negotiate until they are in a position to get
a deal they feel is more favorable to them. Often negotiations
aren't possible until someone feels they're going to win.
How do you approach that problem?
ProfessorFisher: There are lots of situations where the best advice in
the world is not going to produce the result. I may be a great
negotiator, but if I go down and say that I want to buy the White
House, they'll say that it's not for sale. Or if you go into an antique store in Washington or Boston and say that I'm very desirous of a solid sterling Paul Revere bowl, made by Paul himself.
And I go down and say, "I'm a great negotiator; let's negotiate." I
put my wallet on the table. And they say, "Mr. Fisher, the Fine
Arts Museum has offered us a million d6llars for that bowl. Our
bid is better than yours. We're going to walk away unless you
come up with something." I may have some options. I may ask if I
can take a picture of the bowl, can I get a duplicate made from
it. I may ask if I can rent it fully insured for a day to impress my
friends. I may have some options that meet some of my interests,
but there's no chance of getting what I want.
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There's only one office, a corner office, and two faculty members want it. Unless one is willing to work in the day and the
other at night, you'll have a hard time solving that problem. So I
would say in any conflict I think I can get people to do better.
I'm upset that so much of the world thinks that negotiation is a
sign of weakness, for giving in. George Bush said he would not
negotiate with Iraq, not negotiate with terrorists. Me, subject to
reasonable arrangements of personal security, I'll negotiate with
any terrorist. I'm more likely to persuade them than they are to
persuade me.
Negotiation doesn't mean giving in. If I don't negotiate, all
I've got is my military/economic hand and my political hand is
tied behind my back. I don't want to preclude myself from using
all the powers of persuasion, listening, understanding what they
care about, as well as any other stuff I happen to have in terms of
military/economic power. So I feel I'm always stronger if I can
listen to you, understand you, if I can be creative in inventing
ways of meeting your concerns.
In the real world, there is never a zero-sum situation. Never.
Now there are zero-sum aspects: a dollar more for you, a dollar
less for me. But in the real world, it's always possible for both
parties to lose. I can never be sure that loss for you is an equal
gain for me, or vice versa. Or if I lose, you get equal benefit. We
always have a shared interest in not blowing ourselves up. We have
all sorts of shared interests. The question is: by talking, listening,
and creatively understanding and working together, can we craft
something-it may not be perfect-but can we craft something
better than we can without talking, without listening, without working together?
In World War II, there were negotiations going on about the
treatment of prisoners of war. I was in the Air Force. We did
some negotiations with Japan. I was talking about this last night
with some students. The weather plane would not drop bombs,
and we worked out a tacit arrangement that they would not attack
the weather plane. In the Atlantic, we broadcast weather from
Coast Guard ships in a codebook the Nazi's had captured so they
wouldn't sink the boat-tacit negotiations, shared interest. We
would rather you not sink the boat, and we both get the weather.
So I'm always impressed with the potential. Let me do one
quick exercise. This is an exercise to remind you of something
that you may remember later. This is called the arm exercise.
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Would you pair up? What we will do, I'll put my elbow on
the table, and you put your arm up the same way. Now, listen very
carefully to the instructions. Don't break anybody's arm. Listen
very carefully. I get a point every time the back of his hand is
down, and he gets a point every time the back of my hand is
down. I'm totally selfish. You are concerned only with the number
of points you yourself get. You're wholly indifferent as to whether
the other side gets any points or not. You have twenty seconds.
No talking. Let's see how many points you can get. On your mark.
Go.
Stop. Some of you got less than -two, less than one. How
many did you get? One each. None. Zero. You got twenty each.
Those of you who got less than two or three were making a classic
mistake of assuming an adversarial situation. You were assuming
that what was good for the other side is bad for you. Those who
flip-flopped their arms back and forth realized that the best way to
satisfy my own interest is to satisfy the interest of the other party
and that I have an interest in the other side being satisfied because that way they'll go along with me and I'll get more points. I
told you that you were wholly indifferent to how many points the
other side got, and yet some of you struggled. This group is better
than many. I've gone with 150 business people and have one pair
who went back and forth.
The assumption that if we're dealing with a situation where
our interests differ, that that's just kind of a tough adversarial
situation and what are we going to do about it. It's deeply held.
There's a sports metaphor for this.
In dealing with conflict, some people say, how should I deal
with that conflict' My question first comes if two people come to
me. Let's say a husband and wife have decided on divorce, and
they come to me and they say, Roger, we have kids, a house, not
enough money, but we've really got to split. How do we negotiate
the terms of this divorce? We don't want to pay lawyers to litigate
this thing. What is the process we go through? I give them the
best advice I can. They leave. The wife sneaks back in and says,
now, Roger, really, what should I do? Would I change my advice
at all? I might be able to help her on how to use my advice: know
your interests very clearly, work out some options. But I would
have told both of them the same thing.
We have such a shared interest in dealing with our differences skillfully. But I don't believe I have to change my advice one
whit, keeping it from one side or the other. I can tell people how
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to deal with their conflict whether I am coaching the government
or the A.N.C. They both know I'm giving the same workshop. I
was very pleased when [Nelson] Mandela came in at the end and
I said, "You know, I'm teaching the government too." Just like that
he said, "Great, they need it even worse than we do."
But it is that sense that there are neutral skills, neutral processes, neutral techniques by which we can do it. And that's where
we thinkers and those of us who have time to think are not overwhelmed with problems can have a lot to contribute to where
we're going.
Professor Fick: Thank you.

